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Intellectual Property in Georgia
by Laurence P. Colton*
and
Nigam J. Acharya**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law developments in Georgia in the area of
intellectual property including patents, copyrights, and trademarks from
June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2000. The authors have not attempted to
include all cases that touch upon intellectual property but instead have
selected decisions that are more significant or interesting.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The three primary areas are patent, trademark, and
copyright law. Secondary areas include trade secret, trade dress, and
know-how. Patent and copyright law are provided for in the United
States Constitution.' Thus, the cases regarding these two areas are
based on federal law and are gleaned from the federal courts. Trademark law has both federal2 and state aspects; thus, the cases regarding
this area are based on federal or state law, or both, and are gleaned from
the federal courts and Georgia state courts.

* Member in the firm of Technoprop Colton, L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts University
(B.S., 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Registered to
practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
** Summer Associate in the firm of Technoprop Colton, L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Wisconsin-Madison (B.S., 1998); Emory University (J.D., expected 2001).
1. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. Authors/Writings refers to copyright, and Inventors/Discoveries refers to patent.
2. The Commerce Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark
and unfair competition legislation, provides that Congress shall have power "[to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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PATENT CASES

The Georgia Court of Appeals opinion in Bell v. Sasser3 arose
following the sale of stock of a closely held corporation by the president
of the competing corporation. The closely held corporation brought
action an against the seller and the competing corporation, alleging,
inter alia, that the seller and the competing corporation conspired to
drive the closely held corporation out of business. The seller of stock in
the closely held corporation was the president of the competing
corporation. The superior court denied the seller's and the competing
corporation's motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, and
all parties appealed.4 The Georgia Court of Appeals held a competing
corporation's threats to file a patent infringement suit against a closely
held corporation did not establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to
drive the closely held corporation out of business, absent a showing that
the president of the competing corporation participated in sending the
letters or that the threats were made in bad faith.'
In Nelson v. Adams,6 the Supreme Court held judicial speculation that
the sole shareholder was liable for plaintiff's attorney fees did not justify
adding the sole shareholder as a party after the judgment was entered.7
The Court reasoned this action violated the shareholder's due process
rights as reflected in Rule 15 and Rule 12(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8
After dismissal of plaintiff licensee's patent infringement suit and the
grant of attorney fees and costs for defendants, defendants moved to
amend their third-party complaint to add plaintiff licensee's sole
shareholder as a third-party defendant and also amend the judgment.
This amendment subjected the sole shareholder to individual liability for
these fees.? The Supreme Court held an amended judgment that
imposes liability simultaneously with an amendment of the pleadings
violates Rule 15 and due process." ° Furthermore, the Court held
plaintiff did not waive his due process rights." The Court stressed that
Congress had specifically promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil

3. 238 Ga. App. 843, 520 S.E.2d 287 (1999).
4. Id. at 843-44, 852-53, 520 S.E.2d at 290, 296.
5. Id. at 852-53, 520 S.E.2d at 296.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

120 S. Ct. 1579,

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1587.
1581-82.
1582.
1584-85.
1586.

-

U.S.

-

(2000).
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Procedure to ensure due process, and because Rule 15 specifically gave
of
a ten day period for a party to respond to being joined, the imposition
12
a final judgment before this time violated the Due Process Clause.
In Mackay v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks," the Supreme
Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari after the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction for hearing
either a Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA")' 4 or an Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA)' 5 claim.'6 On October 30, 1996, Mackay filed
a patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"). On January 17, 1997, the PTO notified Mackay his
patent application was incomplete and could not be accorded a filing
date. Mackay did not submit the required materials in the time allowed
by the PTO; therefore, the PTO terminated his patent application.'"
On January 18, 1998, Mackay filed a complaint in the district court
seeking relief of $2 billion because the PTO "willfully negated the
patent."" The district court assumed Mackay was seeking relief under
either the FTCA or the APA, and concluded it had no jurisdiction to hear
the claims. Mackay appealed the district court's dismissal of his case to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("the
D.C. Circuit"). The D.C. Circuit transferred the case to the Federal
Circuit because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
claims relating to practice before the PTO. 9
The district court stated that jurisdiction could not be found for an
FTCA claim because Mackay did not allege that he exhausted his
20
administrative remedies before filing his action in the district court.
Mackay indicated in his complaint that he discussed his patent
application with an examiner at the PTO. He made no allegation that
he exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies available to him,
such as filing a petition with the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to contest the PTO's failure to assign a priority date pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 1.53(e)(2).' Thus, because Mackay did not pursue administrative remedies before filing his complaint in the district court, the

12.

Id.

13.

120 S. Ct. 1438,

__

U.S.

__

(2000).

14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 to 2680 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 to 559; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 706 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
16. Mackay v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, No. 99-1305, 1999 WL 955907,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 1999).
17. Id. at*1.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id. at *1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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district court had no jurisdiction under the FTCA.22 Similarly, the
district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Mackay's claim for
monetary damages under the APA.23 The APA waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States only for "[an action in a court of the
United States seeking relief other than monetary damages."24 Therefore, Mackay's request for monetary damages in the amount of $2 billion
precluded the district court from granting the relief he sought under the
APA.
In College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board,25 the Supreme Court held state infringement of a
patent, though interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others,
may neither be remedied pursuant to authority under the Patent Clause
nor preventively remedied under the Due Process Clause.26 In College
Savings Bank, the patent owner brought an action against a Florida
agency, alleging infringement of a patented apparatus and method for
administering a college investment program. The United States
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court
denied the state agency's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and the agency appealed. 27 The Federal Circuit affirmed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote the opinion for the Court.29
The Court emphasized that the sovereign immunity guaranteed under
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution barred suits against
defendant states and that this immunity could be abrogated pursuant
to the Due Process Clause."0 However, the Court recognized that
appropriate legislation pursuant to authority from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution may be used to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for the State's infringement of
a patent and hence may be a deprivation of property without due
process.31

22. Id. at *3.
23. Id.
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
National Ctr. for Mfg. Sciences v. United States, 114 F.3d 196, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

25. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
26. Id. at 643.
27. Id. at 631.
28. 525 U.S. 1064 (1999).

29. 527 U.S. at 630.
30. Id. at 637 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1964)).

31. Id. at 643.
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A determination of whether a Congressional act validly abrogates
states' sovereign immunity generally requires consideration of two
questions: "whether Congress has 'unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate the immunity,' . . . and second, whether Congress has acted

'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.'"3 2 The Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("Patent Remedy Act")33 clearly
expresses Congress' intention to abrogate states' immunity from patent
infringement claims.34 However, the Supreme Court reiterated that
neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause provided Congress
with the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent
infringement claims.35
Congress may pass legislation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution to abrogate sovereign immunity.36 However, in
order for Congress to do so, "it must identify [states' conduct that
transgresses] the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and
must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct."37 In analyzing whether the Patent Remedy Act was appropriate, the Court in College Savings Bank found the conduct Congress
intended to remedy was "state infringement of patents and the use of
sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the invasion
of the patent rights."3
Although appropriate legislation pursuant to the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment can abrogate state sovereignty, the
propriety of any such legislation "'must be judged with reference to the
historical experience ... it reflects.'" 39 Patents are considered "property" of which no person may be deprived by a state without due process
of law.4 ° Hence, Congress can stop state patent infringement if there
is a pattern or a history of state infringement. The Supreme Court in
College Savings Bank found Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act
absent a showing of any patterns of state patent infringement.4 ' The
Court added that "only where the State provides no remedy, or only
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for [the State's] infringe-

32. Id. at 635 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55).
33. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321 to 2583 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
34. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994).

35.
36.
37.
38.

527 U.S. at 635-36.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.

39. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenback,
383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).

40. 527 U.S. at 642.
41. Id. at 640.
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ment... [can] a deprivation of property without due process result."42
It also noted that with regard to the Patent Remedy Act, Congress had
"barely considered" available remedies for patent infringement claims
against a state.43
In Dickinson v. Zurko,44 the Supreme Court held the APA's standards
govern the judicial .review of findings of fact made by federal administrative agencies and apply when the Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact
made by the PTO.45 The Court stressed that Congress intended
uniform review of administrative agencies and did not exempt the
PTO.46 The Federal Circuit's use of a "clearly erroneous" standard
when reviewing findings of fact made by the PTO was not considered an
"additional requirement" under an APA provision creating an exception
for "additional requirements ...

recognized by law," as required for an

application of the "clearly erroneous" standard rather than the APA's
"substantial evidence" standard. 47 The Supreme Court held that to
show such "additional requirements," more than a possibility of a
heightened standard and more than a preponderance of evidence must
be shown.4" The "[e]xistence of the additional requirement must be
clear."49
In Zurko the patent applicant appealed a decision of the Patent Office
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") rejecting the patent
application. The Federal Circuit reversed the BPAI's decision on the
original submission and also during an en banc rehearing. The court
analyzed the PTO's factual findings using a "clearly erroneous" standard
of review rather than the APA's less stringent standards, which permit
a court to set aside an agency's findings of fact found to be arbitrary,
capricious, (i.e., abuse of discretion), or unsupported by substantial
evidence.5" However, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and applied
the APA's standards to judicial review of the PTO's factfindings.
The APA requires a "meaningful review." " This review of agency
fact-finding is stricter than what Congress believed some courts

42. Id. at 643 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1981)).
43. Id.
44. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

152.
154.
154-55.
155.

50. Id. at 153. The "clearly erroneous" standard is considered a "court/agency review,"

requiring a court to ask whether a reasonable mind might accept a particular evidentiary
record as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 161-62.

51. Id. at 162.
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previously conducted.52 Therefore, a court must review an agency's
reasoning "to determine whether it is 'arbitrary' or 'capricious,' or, if
bound up with a record-based factual conclusion, to determine whether
it is supported by 'substantial evidence.'" 53 The Supreme Court did not
accept the argument that the standard of review will differ depending
on which of the two paths the applicant chose for review: "clearly
erroneous" from a district court or the APA standard from the PTO.54
However, the Court stated that nothing in the opinion prevents the
Federal Circuit from adjusting review standards when necessary.5 5
After Zurko, it is clear that there is less review of the PTO's factual
findings.
In Brasseler U.S.A. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,56 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that a patent
applicant's failure to disclose information relating to a sale to the PTO
that would have barred the patent issuance was inequitable conduct
warranting an award of attorney fees to the prevailing defendant.5
The district court found inequitable conduct although the undisclosed
material information may have been legitimately overlooked during a
rush filing by the applicant's counsel. Once counsel filed the rush
application, the counsel's failure to investigate and disclose the sale
information was considered to be inequitable conduct. The district court
considered counsel's argument that reasonable counsel might differ on
what constitutes a sale irrelevant because counsel did not know of the
sale; therefore, no subjective good faith judgment was found.5"
The district court has discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing
party in exceptional patent cases and may consider its familiarity with
the matter in litigation as well as the interests of justice. For example,
a patentee may be considered to have engaged in inequitable conduct for
purpose of awarding attorney fees by failing to disclose material facts to
the PTO that might otherwise preclude issuance of the patent. 59 In
Brasseler, the prevailing defendant, having established by clear and
convincing evidence that the patentee's failure to disclose material
information to the PTO was inequitable conduct, was entitled to recover
fees spent litigating both the defense on which it prevailed and the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
93 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (S.D. Ga. 1999).
Id. at 1257-58.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1257-58.
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alternative defenses if they were not legally frivolous.6 0 The district
court did not challenge the amount of attorney fees requested by the
prevailing party because it was not challenged on appeal.6
In Maxwell Chase Technologies, L.L.C. v.KMB Produce, Inc.,62 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held
that under a "stream of commerce" theory, an Alabama manufacturer's
sale of absorbent pads to a third party, who it knew would use the pads
to package tomatoes sold in Georgia, subjected the manufacturer to the
personal jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in Georgia.'
In cases like this the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction over a defendant and may establish a prima facie
case of personal jurisdiction by presenting sufficient evidence to
withstand a motion for directed verdict.' The Federal Circuit has been
granted original jurisdiction over any appeals arising under the United
States patent laws; therefore, "[i]n analyzing the issue of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant accused of patent infringement, a district
court must apply the law of the Federal Circuit rather than that of the
regional circuit in which the case arises." 5 The court stated, "[D]espite
this requirement, the same basic test utilized in the Eleventh Circuit for
determining
the existence of personal jurisdiction applies in the Federal
66
Circuit."

The Georgia long arm statute 67 confers personal jurisdiction to the
full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.6" As in this case,
"[wihere a state's long arm statute confers personal jurisdiction to the
limits of due process, the Court may pass over an analysis of the statute
.and exercise personal jurisdiction where the constitutional requirements
are satisfied."6 9 Generally, a party is subject to general jurisdiction in
a forum when it has continuous and systematic contacts, and the party
may be haled into court in that forum on any claim.7 ° If it cannot be
established that the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum, a defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction in
that forum when: (1) it has purposefully established minimum contacts

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1265.
79 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1366-67.
Id. at 1367.

66. Id.
67. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 to 9-10-94, 9-11-4 (1982 & Supp. 2000).
68. 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1368.
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with the forum state; and (2) an exercise of jurisdiction will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.7 In other
words, a plaintiff's cause of action must arise out of or relate to a
defendant's contacts with the forum state; the contacts must show the
defendant purposefully conducted activities within the forum state and
invoked the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws; and the
defendant's contacts with the forum state must demonstrate the
defendant should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in
the forum state.72
In Maxwell the district court held that for purposes of this patent
infringement action, the Alabama manufacturer's single sale of
absorbent pads to a Georgia buyer was sufficient to subject the
manufacturer to specific personal jurisdiction of the federal court within
Further, subjecting the manufacturer to the specific
Georgia.73
personal jurisdiction of the federal court was held to be consistent with
notions of fair play and substantial justice.74 The burden on defendant
in being required to defend the claim in a neighboring state was held to
be slight, and plaintiff was found to have a clear interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief in its home forum.75
III. TRADEMARK CASES
In Frehling Enterprises v. International Select Group, Inc.,76 the
Eleventh Circuit held that for purpose of a service mark infringement
action, the seller of decorative accessories and furniture under the
"OGGETTI" service mark created a likelihood of confusion resulting from
use of the "BELL' OGGETTI" trademark by the seller of ready-toPlaintiff
assemble furniture for housing electronic equipment.77
brought an action alleging its "OGGETTI" service mark was infringed
and diluted by defendant's use of "BELL' OGGETTI."78 Following a
bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of defendant, and plaintiff
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.79
The Eleventh Circuit set out the well-known test for a plaintiff to
prevail in an infringement action under the Lanham Act: (1) that its

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id.
192 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1334-35.
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mark has priority; and (2) that the defendant's mark is likely to cause
consumer confusion. 80 The Eleventh Circuit then set out the factors
used in assessing whether a likelihood of consumer confusion exists in
an infringement action under the Lanham Act:8' (1) type of mark; (2)
similarity of mark; (3) similarity of the products; (4) similarity of the
parties' retail outlets, trade channels, and customers; (5) similarity of
advertising media; (6) defendant's intent; and (7) actual confusion.8
Of these factors, the Eleventh Circuit held the type of mark and the
evidence of actual confusion were most important in this case, and the
findings as to each factor, and as to the ultimate conclusion regarding
whether a likelihood of confusion existed, are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review.8" The mere fact that plaintiff's mark was
a service mark relating to selling furniture and defendant's mark was a
trademark relating to actual furniture goods did not affect the analysis
of the likelihood of confusion in an infringement action.84
First, the Eleventh Circuit considered the strength of plaintiff's
mark.8 5 The stronger a mark, the greater the scope of protection
accorded it. The court noted four categories of trademarks: (1) generic,
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary.86 "Generic" marks
refer to a class of goods or services. They are weakest and not entitled
to protection. "Descriptive" marks describe a characteristic or quality of
the goods or services. "Suggestive" marks suggest characteristics of the
goods or services and require an effort of the imagination by the
consumer to be understood as descriptive. "Arbitrary" marks are words
or phrases that bear no relationship to the goods or services and are the
strongest of the four categories.8
As part of this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit considered the degree to
which third parties make use of a mark.88 The less that third parties
use the mark, other than as a trademark or service mark, the stronger
it is and the more protection it deserves.89 Further, if the mark has
been registered for five years with the PTO, its holder has filed the
required affidavit with the PTO, and the PTO accordingly has declared
the mark "incontestable," then the mark's incontestability serves to

80. Id. at 1335.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
82. 192 F.3d at 1335.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1334 n.3.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1335-37.
1335.
1335-36.
1336.
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enhance its strength. 9 The Eleventh Circuit also considered the
"doctrine of foreign equivalents," under which a foreign word that is
commonly used in that language as the generic name of a product cannot
be imported into the United States and transformed into a valid
trademark. 9 However, the Eleventh Circuit found the doctrine of
foreign equivalents was inapplicable in this case because it agreed with
the district court that the mark was at least suggestive.92
Second, the Eleventh Circuit compared the marks and considered the
impressions that the marks create, including the sound, appearance, and
manner in which they are used.93 For the purpose of assessing the
similarity of plaintiff's "OGGETTI" mark to defendant's "BELL'
OGGETTI" mark in order to determine a likelihood of confusion,
plaintiff's use of the words "Tavola Collection" in connection with its
"OGGETTI" mark was found not to have undermined the attribution of
the source of defendant's products to "OGGETTI."94 To the contrary,
the Eleventh Circuit decided the words merely suggested they represented a single product line or signature collection of "OGGETTI."9 5 As
part of this analysis, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a service mark
"may be surrounded by additional words of lesser importance and not
96
have its strength diluted."

Third, the Eleventh Circuit looked at similarity between the goods and
services, which required a "determination as to whether the products
and services are the kind that the public attributes to a single source,
not whether the purchasing public can readily distinguish between the
products of the respective parties."97 The Eleventh Circuit could not
conclude this factor favored a particular party;98 therefore, the court
concluded the district court erred in this respect.
Fourth, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the similarity of the parties'
retail outlets or trade channels and the parties' customers, taking into
consideration where, how, and to whom the parties' products are sold. 99
Although direct competition between the parties is not required for this
factor to support a likelihood of confusion, evidence that the products
and services are provided in the same stores is certainly strong evidence

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1336 n.3.
at 1337.

at 1338.
at 1339.
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favoring a likelihood of confusion. 00 The court stated that differences
"between the retail outlets for and the predominant customers of
plaintiff's and defendant's goods lessen the possibility of confusion...
[however,] [t]he parties' outlets and customer bases need not be
It is enough
identical" to support finding a likelihood of confusion.'
that some degree of overlap be present. 0 2 Although the Eleventh
Circuit could not determine which side this factor favored, the court
noted it was "troubled by the district court's methodology of dividing the
world up into distinct segments of 'affluent' and 'less affluent' for the
purpose of determining the balance of the instant factor."0 3
Fifth, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the advertising media used by the
parties.' 4' The Eleventh Circuit held that "the standard is whether
there is likely to be significant enough overlap in the readership of the
publications in which the parties advertise that a possibility of confusion
could result" and that the identity of periodicals is not required to show
parties use similar methods of advertising.' 5
Sixth, the Eleventh Circuit addressed defendant's intent and held that
"if it can be shown that a defendant adopted a plaintiff's mark with the
intention of deriving a benefit from the plaintiff's business reputation,
this fact alone may be enough to justify the inference that there is
confusing similarity."' ° The Eleventh Circuit concluded defendant
attempted to derive a benefit from "willful blindness" by not conducting
a registration search and the continued use of the mark was contrary to
their own counsel's advice."0 7
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit looked for instances of actual confusion
by the consuming public between plaintiff's and defendant's goods. 108
Although evidence of actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood
of confusion, the court noted such evidence is not a prerequisite.'0 9 As
part of its analysis, the court held lack of survey evidence is not
dispositive as to whether a plaintiff has shown actual confusion."0
When the court assessed all of these factors, consumers could possibly
attribute the parties' products to the same source despite their somewhat

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1339-40.
1340.
1340-41.
1340.
1341 n.5.
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different composition, function, and design; therefore, the court reversed
the district court's decision and found infringement by defendant.'
In Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc.,112 the Eleventh Circuit
held that "registered trademarks that have become incontestable ...
may still be declared invalid if they are found to protect the functional
features of a product.""' The subsequent statutory amendment to the
Lanham Act,"" which implemented the Trademark Law Treaty and
explicitly added functionality as a defense, did not demonstrate prior
Congressional intent to preclude this defense. 15 Plaintiff, a foreign
manufacturer of plug-in blade fuses for automobiles, brought an action
against defendant competitor seeking a declaration that plaintiff's fuses
did not infringe upon the registered trade dress of defendant's fuses.
Defendant counterclaimed for trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and unlawful importation. The district court invalidated defendant's federally registered trademarks and denied defendant's counterclaims. Defendant appealed." 6 The court of appeals held incontestable trademarks are subject to cancellation based on functionality." 7
The Lanham Act provides that incontestability of trademark narrows,
but does not eliminate, the grounds upon which a defendant may call the
trademark's validity into question." 8 The court stated that the
Lanham Act's "incontestability provisions allow a 'registrant to quiet
title in the ownership of his mark. The opportunity to obtain incontestable status by satisfying the requirements ...thus encourages producers
to cultivate the goodwill associated with a particular mark.""' 9 The
Eleventh Circuit chose not to apply the Fourth Circuit's rationale 2 °
that functionality is not one of the grounds for invalidating an incontestable trademark and instead held that functionality is a basis for the
cancellation of incontestable trademarks.' 2 '
The court held that "[the applicability of the functionality doctrine to
a trademark that is the subject of an incontestable registration is a
question of law," which the court of appeals can review de novo."'

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1342.
177 F.3d 1204 (l1th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1206.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1058 to 1060, 1062, 1126 (Supp. 1998).
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1206-07.
Id. at 1208.
Id. (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993).
177 F.3d at 1209.
Id. at 1207 (citing McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 968 (11th Cir. 1994)).
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Under the functionality doctrine, no trademark rights may be claimed
in a product's functional shapes or features, such as the shape of the
automobile fuses. 2 ' The proscription against granting trademark
rights to a product's functional shapes or features serves two purposes.
First, it ensures "that competitors remain free to copy useful product
features," thereby preventing "the trademark law from undermining its
own pro-competitive objectives. Second, the functionality doctrine
prevents the trademark law from conflicting with the patent law by
eliminating trademark monopolies of potentially unlimited duration on
a product's utilitarian features."'24
In Pine Tree Publishing, Inc. v. Community Holdings, Inc. ,125 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held the trial court could not open a default
without first determining whether the final judgment could be set aside
under the statute governing relief from judgment.'26 After a finding
of default, final judgment was entered in a trademark infringement case.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to open the default judgment.
Plaintiff appealed.'2 7 The court of appeals held the trial court could
not open the default without first determining whether the final
judgment could be set aside under the state statute governing relief from
judgment.'28
In Macon-Bibb County Board of Tax Assessors v. J.C. Penney Co.,129
the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a jury's determination of the fair
market value of property that was significantly lower than the tax
assessor's determination. 3 ° The board appealed. The court of appeals
held that for the purposes of ad valorem taxation, the fair market value
of personal property may be determined by the following: cost to the
taxpayer, wholesale pricing in relation to the retail field, and intangibles
such as trademark rights.'
The court further held that "the jury's
verdict [was] supported in part by the [expert's] methodology that

123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)). By
explicitly requiring that the inventor's exclusive right as embodied in a granted patent
must be of a limited duration, the Constitution's Patent Clause "strikes a balance between
the encouragement of innovation and the establishment of a public domain of freely
available inventions to foster competition." Id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)).
125. 242 Ga. App. 689, 531 S.E.2d 137 (2000).
126. Id. at 689-90.
127. Id. at 689.
128. Id. at 689-90.
129. 239 Ga. App. 322, 521 S.E.2d 234 (1999).
130. Id. at 324-25, 521 S.E.2d at 236.
131. Id. at 324, 521 S.E.2d at 236.
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reduced the end-of-calendar-year costs by such factors as obsolescence
and intangible, nontransferable trademark rights."3 2
In College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board,33 the Supreme Court held Florida Prepaid did not
implicitly nor constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit under the Lanham Act by selling and advertising a for-profit
educational investment vehicle in interstate commerce after being put
on notice by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act ("TRCA") that it
The Supreme
would be subject to Lanham Act liability for doing so.'
Court held federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain this type of
was neither validly
suit because Florida Prepaid's sovereign immunity
5
waived.13
voluntarily
nor
TRCA
the
by
abrogated
In College Savings Bank, petitioner (College Savings Bank) markets
and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. When
respondent (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, began its own
tuition prepayment program, petitioner filed suit, alleging respondent
violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by misrepresenting its own
program. 3 6 In granting respondent's motion to dismiss based on
sovereign immunity, the district court rejected arguments that
under the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v. Terminal Railway
of Alabama Docks Department,[13] ...[respondent] waived its immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its
program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject
it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the
TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.' 38
The Third Circuit affirmed.' 3 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4 o Overruling Parden, the Supreme Court held state sovereign
nor voluntarily
immunity was neither validly abrogated by the TRCA141
waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
Id. at 680.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 670-71.
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
527 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 680, 691.
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The Court declared a state's immunity from suit can only be abrogated
in two instances.1, 2 First, Congress may authorize these suits while
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment." Second, the court noted that
"a state may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to a suit."144
However, the Supreme Court made it clear that Congress may not
abrogate sovereign immunity through the Commerce Clause.1 45 The
Supreme Court held neither the right to be free from a competitor's false
advertising nor the right to be secure in one's business interests
qualified as a "property right" protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to authorize abrogation of immunity
against claims under the Lanham Act section that affords a private right
of action against any person who
uses false descriptions or makes false
1 4
representations in commerce.

1

A state's decision to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity is a
voluntary sovereign act.1 47 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's test for
determining whether a state has waived its immunity from federal
jurisdiction is stringent. 148 The Supreme Court will find a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity if a state either voluntarily invokes the
Court's jurisdiction or makes a "clear declaration" that it intends to
submit itself to the Court's jurisdiction. 149 A state does not consent to
a suit in federal court merely by consenting to a suit in its own courts
or by stating its intention to "sue and be sued," or by authorizing suits
against it "in any court of competent jurisdiction." 5 ° In overruling
Parden, the Supreme Court held courts should make every reasonable
presumption against a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity and
that waivers are not implied.' 5 ' The constitutional principle of state
sovereign immunity "is any less robust where the asserted basis for
constructive waiver is conduct that the state realistically could choose to

142. Id. at 670. The court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted after
the Eleventh Amendment and was "specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance."

Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 672.
146. Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
147. Id. at 675 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858)).
148. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)).
149. Id. at 675-76 (citing Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)).
150. Id. at 676 (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441-45 (1900); Florida Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50
(1981); Kenecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-79 (1946)).
151. Id. at 682 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937)).
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abandon, that is undertaken for profit, that is traditionally performed by
private citizens and corporations, and that otherwise resembles the
behavior of market participants."5 2
It is well established that an individual may sue a state when
Congress has authorized this type of suit through its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment 53 or when a state has waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.'54 The TRCA subjects states to
suits brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and
misleading advertising. However, the Supreme Court held the TRCA did
not abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the clear
language in the Lanham Act notifying states of the possibility of
suits.'55 Although Congress may legislate under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Amendment's other provisions,
the object of the legislation must be to remedy or prevent constitutional
Therefore, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner's
violations. 5 '
argument that Congress enacted the TRCA to remedy and prevent state
deprivations of two property interests without due process. 5 '
In Leigh v. Warner Bros., 58 the Eleventh Circuit held a photographer was not entitled to trademark protection when there was no
sufficient evidence showing that the photographer had trademark rights
in a photograph prior to the release of a movie."' The photograph at
issue was the now-famous photograph appearing on the cover of the
novel Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil."6 The court held the
photograph was used in various art gallery and museum advertisements
as an example of the photographer's available work rather than as a
trademark.' 6
Plaintiff photographer, who had been hired to take a photograph that
would appear on the cover of the novel, brought suit against defendant
motion picture company for its alleged copyright and trademark
infringement.6 2 The district court granted summary judgment for
defendant, and plaintiff appealed."

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 684.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447 (1976).
See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883).
527 U.S. at 671-74.
Id. at 672.
Id.
212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
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The court in Leigh reiterated that the plaintiff, under the general rule
for prevailing on claims of trademark infringement, has the burden of
showing: (1) that the plaintiff had a valid trademark and (2) that the
defendant had adopted an identical or similar mark so that consumers
were likely to confuse the two."M The court stated that for a trademark to exist, it must not only be descriptive, but it must also answer
the question "Who made it?" rather than "What is it?" 6 5 Further, to

be infringed, the plaintiff's use of the mark must predate the defendant's
use of its potentially confusing mark.'66
However, in Leigh the court held that even if plaintiff had trademark
rights in the picture of the cemetery statue, defendant did not infringe
upon plaintiff's rights by building its own replica of the statue to
photograph and film.'6 7 Specifically, the court noted plaintiff's picture
was not altered or distorted and defendant never attributed its images
of the copy of the statue to plaintiff."
In Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili,'69 the Eleventh Circuit held that
under Florida law, defendant manufacturer was not unjustly enriched
by plaintiff distributor's advertising and promotion of defendant's tools
because plaintiff engaged in those activities with the objective of making
a profit for itself, and not for defendant. 7 ° Plaintiff brought an action
against defendant alleging Lanham Act violations and unjust enrichment
arising from defendant's use of certain trademarks after the parties'
business relationship ended. After the jury entered a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff for $1,741,993 on the unjust enrichment claim, the district
court granted the manufacturer's motion for a judgment as a matter of
law.' 71 Plaintiff appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
districts court's judgment that the manufacturer was not unjustly
enriched by the distributor's advertising and promotion of defendant's
tools. 172

Under Florida law, "a claim for unjust enrichment is an equitable
claim, based on a legal fiction created by courts to imply a 'contract' as

164.

Id. at 1216.

165. Id. at 1216-17 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3-6 (4th ed. 2000)).

166. Id. at 1217 (citing Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018,
1022 (11th Cir. 1990)).
167. Id. at 1218-19.
168. Id.
169. 198 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 1999).
170. Id. at 807.
171. Id. at 804-05.
172. Id. at 808.
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a matter of law."' 73 Thus, although the parties may have never
indicated in any way there was any agreement between them, the law
creates a quasi-contract in situations in which it is deemed unjust for
one party to have received a benefit without having to pay compensation
for it.' 74 The court stated:
To succeed in a suit for unjust enrichment a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has
knowledge thereof; (2) the defendant has voluntarily accepted and
retained the benefit conferred; and (3) the circumstances are such that
it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
paying the value thereof to the plaintiff.'75
In the present case, because the court determined plaintiff acted for its
own benefit, defendant's use of certain trademarks did not create unjust
enrichment and the district court's consideration of the distributor's
expectation of compensation, in determining whether it would be unjust
for the manufacturer to retain a benefit from use of the trademarks
without having to pay for it, was proper.'7 6
In Carnival Brand Seafood Co. v. Carnival Brands, Inc.,"' the
Eleventh Circuit held that
.a trademark owner cannot by the normal expansion of its business
extend the use or registration of its mark to distinctly different goods
or services not comprehended by its previous use ... where the result
could be a conflict with valuable intervening rights established by
another through extensive use ...of the same or similar mark for like
or similar goods and services."17
The court also observed that "[t]o prevail on a trademark infringement
claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) its mark has priority; and (2) the
defendant's mark is likely to cause consumer confusion."'79 In this
case, plaintiff, owner of the "CARNIVAL" trademark for shrimp and
other seafood products, brought an infringement action against a seller
of Creole and Cajun food products that also bore the "CARNIVAL" mark.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant, and

173. Id. at 805.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 807-08.
177. 187 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting American Stock Exchange, Inc. v. American Express Co.,
207 U.S.P.Q. 356, 364 (T.T.A.B. 1980)).
179. Id. at 1309.
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plaintiff appealed. 8 ° The Eleventh Circuit held the proper disposition
of the case depended necessarily on the resolution of genuine issues of
material fact regarding (1) "the likelihood of confusion of source,
sponsorship, or affiliation with respect" to the products and (2) whether
defendant was the senior and priority user
of the mark. 8 ' The lower
i 2
vacated.
was
therefore,
court's judgment,
First, the court determined plaintiff had priority in the use of the
mark in connection with the selling of raw shrimp products. 3 "'The
senior user's rights may extend into uses in "related" product or service
markets (termed the "related goods" doctrine).""'
However, the court
held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether it would
have been natural for plaintiff to expand its business into seafood and
chicken gumbo and then into shrimp cakes, crawfish cakes, lobster
cakes, and crab cakes. 8 It could not be decided whether defendant's
subsequent use of the "CARNIVAL" mark to sell those products created
8 6
a likelihood of confusion until that determination was made.
Additionally, when using a likelihood of confusion test to analyze a
trademark priority question by looking at whether a senior user's rights
would naturally expand to a junior user's use of the mark, the court
must consider the state of events that existed at the time the intervening use commenced. 8 7 Because the district court had not made that
determination, summary judgment in favor of plaintiff was reversed. 8
Second, the court found the trademark "CARNIVAL" would be an
arbitrary mark as applied to raw shrimp because, although it is a word
in common usage, it is being applied to goods unrelated to its meaning.'8 9 Thus, if the district court determines plaintiff's natural zone of
expansion includes defendant's products, plaintiff has a stronger case.
IV. COPYRIGHT CASES
In Leigh v. Warner Bros.,19° the Eleventh Circuit declared copyright
protection covers the "concrete elements of a photographer's craft" such
as lighting, shading, timing, angle, and film; however, the court declined

180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 1315-16.
Id. at 1316.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310 (quoting Talley.Ho, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1023).
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000).
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to "unwittingly extend[]" copyright protection to the photographer's
choice of subject matter or to the "eerie," "spiritual" mood that was
commonly associated with the subject matter.' 9' Plaintiff brought suit
against defendant for its alleged copyright infringement. The district
court granted summary judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed.'92 The Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) the film did not infringe
the photographer's copyright; and (2) a fact issue existed as to whether
defendant's193 publicity photographs infringed the photographer's
copyright.
The Eleventh Circuit reiterated "'that [t]o establish a claim of
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove, first that he owns a valid
copyright in a work and, second, that the defendant copied original
A copyright infringement plaintiff "can
elements of that work.'""'
prove copying either directly or indirectly, by establishing that the
defendant had access, and produced something 'substantially similar' to
the copyrighted work."' 95 The court stated that "[n]o matter how the
copying is proved, the plaintiff must also establish specifically that the
allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's work
with regard to its protected elements." 96 Thus, even if a defendant
attempts to appropriate a copyright owner's original expression, the
defendant does not infringe unless the defendant's work is substantially
similar to protected elements of the owner's work.
In Leigh, at issue were defendant's film sequences and publicity
photographs featuring the cemetery statue that was central to the
The district court held, and the Eleventh Circuit
photograph.' 97
agreed, that the film sequences were not substantially similar to the
copyrighted photograph of the statue and thus did not infringe, deciding
that the only commonality between the film sequences and the photo98
However, the Eleventh Circuit disgraph was the statue itself.1
agreed with the district court's holding that the publicity photographs
did not infringe upon the photographer's copyright."9 The court found

191.

Id. at 1214-15.

192.
193.

Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1215-16.

194.

Id. at 1214 (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,

361 (1991)).
195. Id. (quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821,
829 (11th Cir. 1982)).
196. Id. (citing Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248, 1257 (11th

Cir. 1999)).
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1216.
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there was an issue of material fact as to whether the promotional
photographs taken for the motion picture film were substantially similar
to the copyrighted photograph of the statue. °0 Thus, the court
reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary
judgment.2 ' 1
In Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co.,202 the Eleventh
Circuit held the touchstone of awarding attorney fees under the
Copyright Act2 3 is whether imposition of attorney fees will further the
interests of the Act.2° For example, attorney fees can be awarded if
by doing so, the court would be "encouraging the raising of objectively
reasonable claims and defenses, which may serve not only to deter
infringement but also to ensure 'that the boundaries of copyright law
[are] demarcated as clearly as possible' in order to maximize the public
exposure to valuable works."20 5 After affirming defendant's judgment
in the copyright infringement action, the district court awarded attorney
fees to defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.20 0
In general, when "reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny
[attorney] fees under the Copyright Act, [the Eleventh Circuit] first
determine[s] whether 'the district court weighed the relevant factors and
exercised its discretion.'" 20 7 Plaintiff's good faith in bringing its suit
was not determinative of the issue of attorney fees.208 If the district
court weighed the proper factors, then the court of appeals "'will not
question the [district] court's decision to grant or deny [attorney] fees
absent an abuse of that discretion."'2 9 Some of the factors courts
should consider in making awards of attorney fees to any prevailing
party in a Copyright Act case include: "'frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal
to
components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances
21
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.'

In the present case, the district court erred in considering solely the
financial means of the parties in determining plaintiff should be liable

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
198 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1999).
17 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1101 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842-43 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)).
Id. at 841.
Id. at 842 (quoting Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Montgomery, 168 F.3d at 1303).
Id. (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19).
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"In determining
for the prevailing defendant's attorney fees. 21 1
whether to award attorney fees under [the Copyright Act], the district
court should consider not whether the losing party can afford to pay the
[attorney] fees but whether the imposition of fees will further the goals
of the Copyright Act."212 For this reason, the case was remanded to
the district court.213
In Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 214 the Eleventh Circuit held that Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" speech to the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC"), along with the fact
the speech obtained live broadcasts on radio and television, did not alone
Thus,
constitute a general publication for copyright purposes. 215
copyright protection was not precluded on the ground the speech was
public domain. 216 The estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. sued defendant television network (CBS), claiming use of the famous speech in a
historical documentary was a copyright violation. 2 7 The District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor
of defendant, holding 218as a matter of law that Dr. King's speech was a
"general publication."
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, an author received state common law
protection automatically at the time of creation of a work, and this
protection persisted until the moment of general publication. 219 When
a general publication of the work occurred, the author forfeited his work
to the public domain unless he had complied with federal statutory
requirements, in which case he converted his common law copyright
into a federal statutory copyright. 220 Also under the 1909 Copyright
Act, a "general publication," which divested a common law copyright,
occurred when a work was made available to the public without regard
to identity or what the public intended to do with the work.221 A
"limited publication," which did not divest a common law copyright, was
"one that communicated the contents of a work to a select group and for

211. Id.
212.

Id. at 843.

213. Id.
214. 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1217.
1213, 1216-17.
1213.
1213-14.

219. Id. at 1214 (citing MELVILLE R. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 4.01[B] 1 (1998); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
220. Id. (citing King v. Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
221. Id. at 1215.
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a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction,
distribution or sale."222
The court discussed a general publication in detail, holding a general
publication occurs, for copyright purposes, "if tangible copies of the work
are distributed to the general public in such a manner as allows the
general public to exercise dominion and control over the work." 221 A
general publication also may "occur if the work is exhibited or displayed
in such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general
public." 224 However, a performance is not considered a general publication, no matter what the size of the audience is or to what extent the
performance receives radio and television coverage.225 Case law also
supports the notion that distribution of a work to the media for new
Thus, the
purposes constitutes merely "limited publication."226
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
and remanded the case to determine whether Dr. King's oration was a
general or limited publication.22 7
In Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment,228 the Eleventh Circuit held
plaintiff's act of delivering a copy of a screenplay to a limited group of
people,229 combined with the alleged presence of these recipients and
defendant at the same film festival, did not establish defendant had a
reasonable opportunity to view the screenplay, as required to establish
the author's claim of copyright infringement. 2 ° The author of the
screenplay brought a copyright infringement action against the writerdirector, the producer, and the distributor of the motion picture Lone
Star alleging defendants used the author's screenplay to make the
motion picture.2"' The District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted summary judgment for defendants; the author appealed;
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment.2"2
The district court declared, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, that to
"state a claim for copyright infringement, 'two elements must be proven:

222. Id. at 1214-15 (citing Burke v. National Broad. Co., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir.
1979) (quoting White v. Kimmell, 193 F.3d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952))).
223. Id. at 1215 (citing Burke, 598 F.2d at 693).
224. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907)).
225. Id. at 1217.
226. Id. at 1218.
227. Id. at 1220.
228. 193 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 1999).
229. Id. at 1249. The group included the author's thesis committee, a fellow student,
and an adjunct professor. Id.
230. Id. at 1249-50.
231. Id. at 1243.
232. Id. at 1243-44.
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(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original."'233 If a copyright infringement
plaintiff does not have direct proof of copying, the plaintiff may prove
copying circumstantially by demonstrating both that: (1) the defendants
had access to the plaintiff's work and (2) the works are substantially
similar." 4 The district court stated that "if the plaintiff cannot show
access, the plaintiff may still prevail by demonstrating that the works
are 'strikingly similar."'23 5 To show substantial similarity, a copyright
infringement plaintiff "must establish that 'an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work.'" 236 However, the protection granted to a copyright
"'extends only to the particular expression of an idea and never to the
idea itself.'" 2 7 Scenes a faire, which are "'sequences of events that
necessarily follow from a common theme,'" are not protectible under
copyright law.238
Although some circuits and courts may define access as the actual
viewing and knowledge of a plaintiff's work, the Eleventh Circuit defines
access to a copyrighted work as a reasonable possibility of viewing a
plaintiff's work, but may not infer access from mere speculation or
conjecture.23 9 Further, an inference of access to a copyrighted work
based on a third party's possession of that work requires more than a
mere allegation that someone known to the defendant possessed the
work in question. 2' For example, unusual speed in the creation of a
work may constitute some evidence that there was access to and use of
a copyrighted work rather than independent creation. 241' However, in
the present case, the district court held, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed,
that neither the short three-month period in which the writer-director
wrote the motion picture, nor the almost two-year time period between
defendant's alleged access to plaintiff's copyrighted work and his writing
of the motion picture, was sufficiently short to raise the inference that

233. Id. at 1247-48 (quoting Feist Publications,Inc., 499 U.S. at 361).
234. Id. at 1248.
235. Id. (citing Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978)).
236. Id. (quoting Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d at 829).
237. Id. (quoting Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1976)).
238. Id. (quoting Reyher, 533 F.2d at 91). Scenes a faire include "[i]ncidents,
characters, or settings that are indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given
topic." Id.
239. Id. at 1249.
240. Id. at 1252.
241. Id. at 1256.
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defendant had access to plaintiff's work, as required to establish
copyright infringement.24 2
Next, to establish substantial similarity between a copyrighted work
and an allegedly infringing work, a plaintiff must satisfy both an
extrinsic or objective test and an intrinsic or subjective test.243 "Under

the extrinsic test, the court will inquire into whether, as an objective
matter, the works are substantially similar in protected expression [and]
... determine whether a plaintiff seeks to protect only uncopyrightable
elements

...

.,,244

The court noted that "under the intrinsic test, a

court will determine whether, upon proper instruction, a reasonable jury
would find that the works are substantially similar."245 Often, a
plaintiff will present a list of similarities between the copyrighted work
and the allegedly infringing work. However, this court found these lists
of similarities are "'inherently subjective and unreliable,' particularly
where the list contains random similarities, and many such similarities
could be found in very dissimilar works."246
Once a copyright infringement plaintiff shows that the person who
composed the defendant's work had access to the copyrighted material
and that substantial similarity between the two works exists, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that his or her work was not a copy, but
rather was an independent creation.247 In Herzog the Eleventh Circuit
held a screenplay author could not establish a claim of copyright
infringement against the writer-director of a motion picture unless
substantial similarities existed between the works.248 Although
plaintiff alleged the works' characters, themes, plots, and other elements
were similar, the court declared these similarities were not copyrightable
and no reasonable person could find substantial similarities between the
works.249

242. Id.
243. Id. at 1257 (citing Beal v. Paramount Pictures, 806 F. Supp. 963, 967 (N.D. Ga.
1992)).
244. Id. (citing Beal, 20 F.3d at 461-64).
245.

Id. (citing Beal, 806 F. Supp. at 967). Under the extrinsic test, expert testimony

and analytic dissection are appropriate. Id. (citing Beal, 20 F.3d at 461-64).
246. Id. (quoting Beal, 20 F.3d at 460). The court cited several examples of themes that
are prevalent in literature: crooked law enforcement officers brought to justice by their
peers is a basic, unprotectible police story convention; characters who keep secrets are a
basic, unprotectible murder mystery convention; and death due to foul play instead of

natural
247.
248.
249.

causes is a standard unprotectible element of murder mysteries. Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1247-48.
Id. at 1257-63.
Id. at 1263.
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In Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc.,5' the Eleventh Circuit held that
"[wihile an exclusive license to use copyrighted material must be written,
a nonexclusive license can be granted orally or can be implied from the
conduct of the parties."2 51 Plaintiff wrote a jingle while an employee
for the radio station and then brought a copyright infringement action
against the owner of a radio station that allegedly played the jingle
without authorization on the grounds that plaintiff's authorization ended
with her employment.2 52 The District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted summary judgment for the owner, and the writer
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.253
In Korman the Eleventh Circuit held the author of a jingle granted a
radio station an implied, nonexclusive license to use the jingle based on
the author's conduct. 2" The Copyright Act provides that transfers of
copyright ownership must be in writing.255 However, the court held
this writing requirement has no application to nonexclusive licenses,
which do not transfer ownership. 26 Hence, the nonexclusive license
granted by the author of the jingle to the radio station went into effect
when the author permitted the radio station to use the jingle notwithstanding the absence of a writing.257
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the Copyright Act provision for the
termination of exclusive and nonexclusive licenses to use copyrighted
materials may not be applicable to Korman.25 8 Although this provision
applies to implied, as well as express, nonexclusive licenses, the
Eleventh Circuit held the implied nonexclusive license, which was
granted by the jingle author to the radio station for use of the jingle for
an infinite duration, was not subject to the minimum term of thirty-five
years under the Copyright Act so long as the license would otherwise be
subject to earlier termination under state contract law.25 9

When a

license is granted for an indefinite period, the Ninth Circuit has held the
Copyright Act provision mandating a minimum license term of thirtyfive years preempts state law, which might allow for earlier termina-

250. 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
251. Id. at 1293.
252. Id. at 1292-93.
253. Id. at 1293-94.
254. Id. at 1293. The author had written jingles for the station during the prior sevenyear period and had allowed the station to air those jingles during that time. Id.
255. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
256. 182 F.3d at 1294.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1297.
259. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

tion.2 ° The court in Korman declined to follow the Ninth Circuit, but
instead agreed with the Seventh Circuit, which has held the provision
does not preempt state law." 1 The court noted that "it is a wellestablished 262
principle that state law is read into and becomes a part of
a contract."

In Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere,2 the Eleventh Circuit held that a
plaintiff in an infringement action may be entitled to both statutory
damages and injunctive relief and that it was within the trial court's
discretion to allow both.264 Plaintiff produced a "steel decking product"
and brought a copyright infringement action against defendant and its
president. The District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
On remand, the district court entered an order preventing the competitor
from holding out its decking to the public as having a fire rating until
the decking was tested, and the competitor again appealed. 6
Defendant's supposed fire rating was obtained without any independent testing and by defendant's admitted infringement of plaintiff's
copyrighted materials on plaintiff's decking. 2 6 In effect, the defendant
copied the plaintiff's materials on similar decking, including the fire
rating of the plaintiff's decking. 2 7 The Eleventh Circuit held the trial
court's injunctive relief was not overbroad because the injunction merely
26
regulated defendant's actions rather than activities of nonparties.
V. TRADE SECRET CASES
In Lamb v. Turbine Designs, Inc.,269 the Eleventh Circuit held the
issue of whether "a nonresident is subject to personal jurisdiction under
the Georgia long-arm statute when he improperly discloses another nonresident's trade secret to a federal agency at its Georgia office" was an
unsettled and pivotal issue essential to the disposition of the case and
Plaintiffs,
warranted certification to the Georgia Supreme Court.
nonresident former shareholders of a corporation, brought an action

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 1295 (citing Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Id. (citing Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 1297.
181 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1282.
Id.
Id. at 1282-83.
Id. at 1284.
207 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1260.
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against defendant, a nonresident competitor, alleging violations of the
Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act,27 the Georgia Trade Secrets
Act,272 and various other state statutory and common law duties.273
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
dismissed the action, and plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.2 74
In general, a state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tort in that state would not offend the United States
Constitution. 2" Thus, if the Georgia Supreme Court decides that,
under the given circumstances, the Georgia long arm statute would
confer jurisdiction over defendants, the Georgia courts could have
jurisdiction.
VI.

TRADE DRESS CASES

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,276 the Supreme Court
found the design of a product is not "inherently distinctive," and
therefore, the Lanham Act provides protection of it as unregistered trade
dress only if it is proven that the design has acquired "secondary
meaning."277 The Court noted that availability of a patent on a design
of a product that has not acquired secondary meaning offsets the harm
that might be caused by the imposed requirement for relief under the
Lanham Act.278 Samara Brothers designs and manufactures a line of
children's clothing. 279 Petitioner, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., "contracted
with a supplier to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara
garments. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were
selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought this action for ...
infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a)" of the Lanham
Act.28' After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the designer, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the retailer's
motion for judgment as matter of law ("JMOL") and its request for a new
trial. The retailer appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of
JMOL. The retailer again appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.2 1

271.
272.

FLA. STAT. §§ 495.011 to 495.181 (1997 & Supp. 2000).
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (2000).

273. Id.
274.
275.
276.

Id.

Id.
529 U.S. 205 (2000).

277. 207 F.3d at 1344.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1340.

280. Id.
281. Id. at 1342.
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The holding of Samara depended on whether trade dress was
protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. After the jury
found for Samara, Wal-Mart renewed a motion for JMOL, claiming there
was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing
designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for the
purposes of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2" 2 The Supreme Court
felt the text of Section 43(a) provided little guidance as to the circumstances under which unregistered trade dress may be protected with the
exception that the trade dress not be functional.2 83 The Court held
that, similar to color, trade dress is not inherently distinctive because it
is not primarily intended to identify the source but rather to render the
product itself more useful or more appealing.2"
The Court also
considered utilitarian arguments of deterring competition for trade dress
and held that in a Section 43(a) action for infringement of unregistered
trade dress, a product's design is distinctive, and therefore protectible,
only upon a showing of secondary meaning.2"5
VII.

FINAL NOTES

June 1, 1999 through May 31, 2000 was an active period in the field
of intellectual property. With the geometrically increasing popularity of
the Internet, the mobility of the country's workforce, and the country's
thirst for anything new under the sun, there are bound to be many more
cutting-edge decisions concerning patents, trademarks, copyrights and
the rest of the intellectual property field.

282. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
283. 207 F.3d at 1343.
284. Id. at 1344.
285. Id. at 1342-43.

